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Aluoch: The Dilemma of Responsibility to Protect

Introduction
This paper examines the underlying complexities that constitute a dilemma for the responsibility
to protect in Africa most specifically the Great Lakes Region. I argue that clarifying the meaning
and intention of the doctrine in any given context is predicated on understanding the distinct and
complex environment in which the doctrine is invoked. These complexities and their
differentiation on a case by case basis construe the doctrine as progressive; with political, legal
and moral significance making it fit for its purpose. On the other hand, the variation of prevention
and protection amounts to the denunciation of it as being selective, complicit, inconsistent and
even imperialistic.
Proponents of R2P confront a major gap between the ideals propounded by the doctrine and
realities that have continued to more often than not negate those ideals making them utopic. A
comprehensive contextualization should be the basis of determining the prospect, relevance and
success of R2P in the great lakes where the need to protect humanity is at crossroad with the
complex environment in which the doctrine applies. The analysis focus on the dilemma hinged
on a multi-layered security environment creating a predicament for great lakes region, the history
and politics of intervention which shapes perspectives and actions and finally effects of global
and regional power imbalance.

History and Synopsis of War and Genocide in the Great Lakes Region.
Great Lakes Region consists of countries in East and Central Africa (Rwanda, Burundi,
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda), forming a complex network of political and
economic interactions with implications on peace, security and governance. At least every
generation in these countries has lived either war or genocide which is estimated to have caused
approximately 2.5 -4 million deaths. Others have continued to experience the indirect effects of
war and genocide reinforcing perception of state fragility and instability.
The conflicts in the region are interlinked, complex and involve a multiplicity of interlocking
state, non-state, regional and international actors. These conflicts have tended to expand
geographically from one country to another; and with a dual character.
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Though current conflicts have a distinct local and/or national anchorage, they are at the same
time linked to the political history, global power influence and underlying security dynamics
resulting from identity crises, lack of state legitimacy, arms proliferation, regime types, natural
resources inter group difference and governance issues. In this region, the question of genocide
and prevention is very provocative. i.e. What is genocide? Who are the potential genocidaires,
who are the victims, how does it differ from other wars and counter insurgencies? What is the
role played by governments? And what preventive options are there if any?

Conceptualising Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The 21st century doctrine ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) is an antithesis of idealism and
reality, reflecting the theory and practice of international politics. It seeks to pursue universal
peace by preventing and protecting vulnerable groups from mass atrocities including genocides,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.1 Its interpretation at normative,
institutional and implementation continues to trigger debates across the divide.
R2P proponents, like Gareth Evans, term it as an emerging norm for collective security in intra
state conflicts, Ann Orford describes it as a pre-existing and tacit norm resulting from the
executive role of the UN;2 the victims of mass atrocities, embodies R2p as progressive and with
suasive value in international politics, law and morality establishing a duty of care, not only to
the sovereign state but the international community.3 For global, regional and sub-regional
organizations and national governments, R2P marks different things. To the powerful and
developed European and Western states, it is a responsibility and duty that arises from their
economic and military privilege.4 For the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries, R2P denotes community security where internal mechanisms are resorted to prevent
and manage crisis situations as opposed to external involvement.5
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In Africa, the doctrine reinforces existing conflict prevention and mitigation mechanisms created
in the 1990s by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and later adopted by
the Africa Union under Article 4 of its Constitutive Act which makes it responsive on prevention
of mass atrocities within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).6
The concept of responsibility denotes;
‘The primary responsibility for protection of a population against serious suffering
resulting from internal wars, insurgency, and repression lies with the state.7If the state in
question is unwilling and or unable to avert the situation, the principle of non intervention
yields to the international responsibility to protect.’8
Obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty
Sovereignty defined
R2P prescribes sovereignty as responsibility. This from the onset creates a problem of
misconception that is further engendered by the term ‘absolute sovereignty’ which rhetorically in the
GLR is often interpreted as undermining sovereignty. This is especially evidenced when non
military measures such as economic sanctions, judicial approach through the ICC and or military
interventions are under consideration. These rhetorics however are often contradictory depending
on the anticipated end result; ie, in pursuit of opponents/insurgent groups, such measures are
resorted to ‘in perceived aid to a weak regime the same is rejected and considered where the source
of problem is alleged to be with the regime of the day.
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Security predicament in Africa
The security predicament in Africa specifically the GLR is understood from a historical and
comparative analysis of the state, security, and interactions therein.16 It includes how the concept
of security as applied in Africa, differs from its traditional use in the international relations
literature; the factors inherent in these states that can help explain this difference; how the
interaction of GLR states with the international system affect the security of the former; and
the relationship between the security and development concerns of GLR states and most third
world states. 17 The overarching aspect is how these interactions affect levels of legitimacy and
social coherence in what Deng terms as a problem of divided nations and cultures whose end
result is identity crisis and conflicts.18
9
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The problem therefore is multi layered, at domestic, regional and international level. With
interactions going through a series whose timeline is traceable from the historical formation of
the African state and flows through arbitral boundary demarcation, colonial legacy of divide and
rule; the cold war politics of containment and post-cold war conflicts hence the crisis of
legitimacy and lack of social coherence.19 While traditionally security threats were perceived as
emanating from external quarters, post-independence and cold war conflicts in GLR, emerged
from internal sources either, the state, opposition and civilians; triggered by internal
vulnerabilities characterized by ethnicity, marginalization,

identity politics which upon

transmutation results to violence and crimes against humanity and acts of genocidal magnitude.20
Coupled with corruption, bad governance and divisive politics, the GLR characterizes
antagonistic relations between the elitist regimes and sections of the populations.21 Making it a
‘quasi state’, meaning it depends upon international norms to preserve its’ sovereign status and
not the popular will of its subjects.22 This ‘caricature’ state lacks legitimacy and coherence that
comes with sovereignty and citizenship envisaged in the Westphalia system. When the material
component- that is the popular will is fragmented, it automatically creates a fragile composition
which conceptually does not affect sovereignty but in practice undermines its very essence.
States within the Great lakes region depicts a lack of popular will, which may be interpreted to
mean no responsibility to the greater masses, save for the section of the society that it enjoys that
legitimacy or coherence and identifiable through ethnicity, culture, religion and in the modern
day, class.23 This is the first dilemma that R2P as a protective norm has to contend with. How
can responsibility be reinforced by a state whose legitimacy is time and again contested by
sections of its population. Essentially it calls for the sovereign to institute that legitimacy and
coherence that is plausible through a state-making process.
Today, regimes in GLR are still struggling to reconcile the duty of state-making alongside
human and political rights. Competing pull and push factors associated with the two amounts to
internal conflicts that pave way for either indiscriminate repression or state failure.
19
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Relatively, the former clashes with international norms and may amount to a systematic
segregation of population through political, social and economic strategies. In the short term,
this breeds stability with a higher probability of outburst which tends to undo all the gains
made and eventually may lead to state collapse. From this, streams systematic threats of political,
social and economic nature with potential to explode to genocidal level owing to their grievous
implications on the population as employed by regimes. For Mamdani, (whether these actions are
termed as genocide, war crime, counter insurgency or war against terror they inflict suffering and pain to
humanity but the politics of naming that applies on Africa and other developing countries based on power
determines what amounts to a threat or mass atrocity and what action can be taken.24

On the contrary, a systematic repression over a long period of time can consolidate legitimacy
foster development and posterity of a nation. This, however, is unacceptable in the 21st century
and so depending on the limits of a society, each continues to struggle to get the right strategy of
consolidating its legitimacy. Thus, the measures of prevention and protection prescribed by R2P
while seeking to address these challenges remain elusive because such reconstruction has not
been defined to address these underlying divisions and incoherence in states.
24

Ibid p. 131
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Deadline and labeling of African states
Tied to the reconstruction of African states is the increasing pressure generated by international
norms such as R2P and domestic elites to translate juridical statehood into effective and functional
statehood- akin to that in developed societies.25 Charles Tilly chronology of European statemaking notes that statehood takes time and requires a relatively free hand to persuade and coerce
populations under its rule to accept legitimacy of the state, its institutions, its right to extract
and use resources from them and let the state regulate aspects of their lives.26 In the modern
age of globalization and mass politics, neither option is available for Africa-GLR. The continent
is prompted to compete with the developed states to raise hopes and dispel fears, which in the long
run increase a burden of political systems to a degree of insecurity that manifest in different
ways-political, social, economic, environment and military.27 Adam Branch observes this
struggle in lieu of global power dynamics that set a stage for African states to be labeled as
effective human right supporters, legitimately sovereign, and deserving recipients of foreign
assistance to build their capacity.28Conversely another platform is set to denounce states as
human right violators, undeserving in foreign support and vulnerable to intervention by the
international community.29 Underlining these are two concerns; the first being which states shall
fall on the first or second cluster. Secondly, while these states may harbor transparency and
precision of international norms and the enforcement institutions the same faith does not extend
to powers mandated to execute these rights. This amounts to suspicion and a lack of
formalization which in the case of R2P allows a multitude of interpretations, claiming moral
conviction without the possibility of addressing the underlying predicaments founded on
statehood.30
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The ‘responsible African state in the phase of state making under R2P witness an expansive
interventionist regime-from state fragility to state building evolving under the Liberal Peace
Thesis which, according to Chandler, is a pointer of liberalism.31 Annan, on these interventions,
explains that a multidimensional failure and predicament in African states requires
multidimensional and equally extensive measures that open up the political, social and economic
space for intervention, giving the UN the mantle to respond.32 At the time of R2P inception in
2001, it recorded more than 91 policy tools for responding to African security threats and
building peace.33Whether these interventions have been applied in context, and proved effective
is another issue altogether. Interventions by the international community in liaison with other
organizations have had mixed traces of success and failure.34 These interventions have been seen
as choking the state- making process making it inculpable of building legitimacy and coherence
which is at the core of any functioning society. (The so called ‘project’ of building state capacity
and moral justification in the language of human rights results to a lack of accountability and
refusal by the African state and international community to be subject to criticism on what
precisely to intervene in, the extent of the intervention and consequences of it.35 In the long run
there is no guarantee that this ‘new state’ will protect its population but continue to contain its
issues. Such processes rather than creating responsible governments, amounts to irresponsibility,
and fragility and the cycle goes on and on.
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The irresponsible states remain subject to internal threats and coercive intervention by the
international community. They are a point of reference on sanctions, prosecutorial measures and
military interventions. Ultimately, these do not comprehensively address the security threats and
impending atrocities but breeds auxiliary discordance amongst the population. This is because
preventive and protective measures of R2P tend to assume some form of uniformity which
should not be the case if the doctrine is to function objectively and successfully. While it is
preferable for the norm to be consistent and uniformly applied, the realities of African states
cannot accord this opportunity because on one hand this uniformity will defeat the purpose of
prevention and protection, and on the other hand it may end up distorting the notion of peace,
justice and democracy-whose meaning is distinct from one society to another. For these reasons
R2P measures in Africa crisis is labeled as too much, too little and too late. The DRC Crisis of
2003-2011, Kenya post-election violence of 2007/08, Somalia collapse from 1992-2012, Sudan
wars 2003-2011, and Cote d’Ivoire election crisis 2010-2012 are samples of security challenges
and R2P situations that denote different meaning in their respective contexts. From these cases
idealists observe a deficit of interventions while skeptics see too much intervention. In reality,
R2P interventions in these cases should be determined on their own merit.
History and politics of intervention
Discussions on the history and politics of intervention (specifically humanitarian intervention)
have been controversial with considerable impact on African perspectives and actions
undertaken. This has dominated the discussions along Global North and South pre- and postR2P adoption in 2005. Humanitarian intervention refers to ‘coercive action by one or more states
involving the use of force in another state without the consent of the authorities to prevent
widespread human suffering.36(force brigade, individual deployment-2003 wars in DRC, M23)
In political terms the alleged ‘right to intervene’ or ‘duty to protect’, has been interpreted as a
language of power and of resistance to some power or authority. Thus a right to protect becomes
an antithesis for a duty or responsibility where practically it is the powerful states that assume the
right and responsibility over the weak states.

36

Weiss (2004)
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As to whether this justifies such interventions’ as being legitimate was ruled by the ICJ on Corfu
Channels Case which upheld that:
‘an alleged right to intervene is a manifestation of a policy that in the past has given rise
to heinous abuses and such as defects maybe in the international organization cannot find
a place in international law from the very fact that interventions for any purpose would be
a reserve for the most powerful and may pervert if not undermine justice.’37
Although R2P clarifies the issue of legitimacy through the inclusion of regional organizations
and multilateralism, the doctrine is ostensibly predicated on political will of the powerful and
power relations within the international system. Since this system is made of unequal states, R2P
is therefore viewed as an instrument of power invoked in congruence of interest as witnessed in
Libya.
In addition, interventions in history have been undertaken for protection of the vulnerable
populations. R2P, (in moralizing and legitimizing intervention on grounds of protection, is
arguably not new but dates as far as 1629 during the foundation of the United States.38 The
Massachusetts Bay Colony was granted its Charter by King Charles 1 stating that the principal
end of the plantation is to save the natives from paganism.39 The great seal of the colony shows
an American Indian calling ‘Come over and Help Us’. This help is discharged via a
responsibility to protect by extirpation40 and extermination of the natives for their own good.41
In developing countries, discussions of R2P in the words of Chomsky are disturbed by the
skeleton in the closet from history to the present time.42

37
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Unlike humanitarian intervention, the doctrine of R2P is founded on a logical flow of order in
the global system. However, in an imperfect and realism world, the politics of survival based on
power and national interest dominate interventions. In the R2P decade, Ramesh Thakur
postulates that in some instances the strategic interests of states converge with the values
enshrined. But it does not subordinate the latter (protection).43 This realization, poses skeptism
and distrust in GLR. With the shifting power imbalances, recession in Western and European
states, Chinese influence, and increasing potential for economic growth following its vast natural
resources interventions on humanitarian protection are continuously view from the lens of
strategic interest. Thus, international norms are inevitably a preferred gateway to safeguard these
interests. So, even in instances of genuine human suffering it remains blurred as to what is the
crux of an intervention.
While historically all interventions have been qualified on the basis of protection, the wordings
and principles of R2P are seen to apply quite generally, meaning it can be interpreted to mean
just anything for the consumer. Its limitation to mass atrocities crimes and limitless measures of
prevention and reaction is open to ambiguity, mischief and abuse. This equates the doctrine to
three historical principles. One is the maxim of Thucydides where the strong do as they wish
while the weak suffer as they must, illustrated by the Melian dialogue.44 Here, the strong refers
to the Security Council, its allies and developed states while the weak refers to the ‘irresponsible’
non allied and alleged rogue states. The end result “hegemonial approach where the voice of the
powerful sets precedents.45
The second general principle that pits states against R2P is founded on Adam Smith’s account of
policy making in England.46 The principal architects of policy - that is merchants and
manufactures ensured that their own interest are most peculiarly met, however grievous the
consequences were on the people of England.47
43

Thakur (2011), p. 13
Alker (1998), p. 820
45
Brownlie (1998), p. 17
46
Smith 1999(1776), p. 247
44

11
Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

In the 21st century such imperialism, according to former UK foreign advisor Robert Cooper
applies in justifiable interventions within international norms.48 The third principle is use of
force where all military interventions in global affairs have been justified in the terms of
responsibility to protect. These includes ousting of regimes from power, and suppression of
dissenting voices. Key cases between 1928 Kellog Briand Pact and United Nations 1945
included; the attack on Manchuria by Japan in 1931, the invasion of Ethiopia by Mussolini in
1938 and Hitlers occupation of Czecholsvakia in 1938.49 All were followed by supercilious
rhetorics on the solemn responsibility to protect the suffering population with detailed
justification.50 Post- 1945, like Vietnam invasion of Cambodia of 1977, Ethiopia invasion on
Eritrea 1998, were also hugely criticized.
The memories of colonialism and its aftermath on state making and security has left most
countries justifiably skeptical on western and regional intervention. Conquest was the norm for
civilization and protection of the population from alleged barbarism of hobbesian societies.51
This to date is unacceptable and even though it is preferable to forget this history and forge
ahead, forgetting is not a wise thing to do especially for the weak.52 This history provides a basis
for learning, reason and wisdom towards a rational convergence of purpose and means in any
given intervention.53
Also the inconsistencies of the international community in responding to humanitarian crisis in
the 1990s,54i.e inaction in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1991 leading to war crimes and crimes
against humanity, withdrawal and subsequent inaction on Somalia 1992, inaction in Rwanda
following the genocide 1994, the Darfur crises, and regime change in Libya and cote divoire
Continue to reinforce the politics of power and interests that determine who intervenes where.
These politics reign in R2P debates within the UN general assembly.55 And prior to adoption of
the UNWSOD in 2005 the G77 and NAM in reference to R2P alleged that sovereignty had been
their last defense against abuse by powerful states.56
49
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Even as they acknowledgement the doctrine, states remained wary of the politics of
protectionism and interventionism which results to abuse and selectivity. Even with options
such as the CPMR within the APSA framework little can be done due to financial
constraints, multiplicity of actors and observed leadership crises where the continental body
operates on the basis of regime interest and not necessarily the populace overall good.
Thus, in a world of realpolitik, the greater concern for Africa like other developing countries is
how to protect the suffering populations from the state exercising unlawful power against its
population and how to protect states from the excesses of the powerful in the international
system who acts on the precepts of their strategic interests as opposed to values?
Constraints emerging from global imbalances and the Security Council.
Another challenge results from global and regional power imbalances and operations of the
Security Council. This system is characterized by developed states, regional hegemony and
developing countries all abiding by standardized norms that are predisposed to inconsistent
interpretation and application.57 Developed states are characterized by strong institutions which
safeguard the rule of law and protect against breach of international norms within their
territories. Also, their economic and military capability gives them leverage over any probable
intervention in their domain or their allies on activities hence a right to dictate the how, when and
where of interventions. These poses concerns over the ethical/moral consideration and at times
legal legitimacy of decisions and actions taken for acts and inactions amounting to fundamental
breach. For a region marked by fragility and lack of strong institutions interventions on grievous
situations is often unlikely or skewed to safeguard geostrategic /political interests.
These imbalance further reflect at regional and sub-regional organizations where states and
organizations are gatekeepers of peace and security under R2P.58 Their proximity to states and
conflicts confer a comparative advantage as legitimate custodians to not only prescribe but take
appropriate actions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and if military, with the authorization
of the Security Council.59 Underlying this responsibility is whether these organizations based on
their practices, architectures, and interactions within the international system are impartial arbiters
in determining situations of R2P under Chapter VII?
57
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In most instances, crisis situations have been determined through subjective political processes
that protect the status quo and not necessarily the interests of a population. Evidently in the
GLR with multiplicity of actors, at disparity, have a variation of weight depending on powers
and interests involved. For example, the AU, EAC has been at the forefront, of diplomacy in R2P
situations in Burundi, UN, AU, SADC, and individual states have made several attempts in the
DRC, both which have resulted to mixed bag of results touching on legitimacy, credibility as
defined by would be interveners.
On prosecutorial means the doctrine has been invoked selectively. Militarily, authorization has to
be sort from the UNSC wit financial limitations to support the missions. Overdependence on
donor agencies whose priorities are increasingly relative are varied and institution/states are
swayed to make determinations favorable to its donors and big powers as opposed to the core
interest on humanity; where in realism morality of the prince is judged not by his actions to
humanity, within the international system but his capacity to pursue national interest and state
survival.60 Thus where mutual relations of states and organization are predicated on mutual
benefits interventions are likely to be face saving and not protection of suffering populations. These
imbalances create a problem of selectivity and double standards where credibility and
legitimacy is subject to continuous scrutiny and contestation.

60
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Conclusion
These three factors characterize the R2P dilemma not only in Africa but internationally. From
this expose’, one is left to wonder whether it is possible to define, redefine and confine the
61

doctrine to fit into the context of each situation without being seen as inconsistent.

While such

ideals should be uniform in interpretation and application, a propitious meaning and clarity of the
doctrine is only attainable if it meets the purpose which is to protect suffering populations from
atrocities thus different contexts necessitate a variation of action. Notably, consistency and
uniformity can only arise if states are at parity which is impractical in the near future. States will
seek to survive in this complex international system and those with economic and military
advantage will remain at the forefront in protection, prevention and rebuilding. Despite the need
for reforms in the Security Council, protection of civilian population necessitates more
effectiveness and legitimacy as opposed to additional numbers which do not guarantee political
and moral resolve for protection.
61

Luck (2009)

Bibliography
Books
Abass, A. (2012), ‘Africa,’ in Genser, R. and Cotler, I (eds.) The Responsibility to
Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press). pp.
109-135.
Ayoob, M. (1995), The Third World Security Predicament (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers)
Baker, R. S (1968), Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters 1st ed. (Newyork: Greenwood Press) p. 173
Branch, A. (2011), ‘The Irresponsibility of the Responsibility to Protect In Africa’, in Cunliffe P. ed.
Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory and Practice
(Newyork:Routeledge) pp. 104-125
Brownlie, I. (1998), The Rule of Law in International Affairs:International Law at the 50th Anniversary of
the UN (The Hague :Kluwer law International) p. 33
Buzan, B.,Waever, O. & Wilde, J.P. (1998), Security: A New framework For Analysis (London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers) pp.21-48
Carr, E.H. (1949), The Twenty Year Crisis 1991-1939 (London: Macmillan press)(title italiced
Chandler, D. (2011), ‘Understanding the Gap Between the Promise and Reality of the Responsibility to
Protect,’ in Cunliffe, P. ed. Critical Perspectives On The Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory
and Practice (Newyork :Routeledge) pp. 19-34
15
Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

Chomsky, N. (2011), ‘The Skeleton in the Closet: The Responsibility to Protect in History, in Cunliffe, P.
ed. Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory and Practice
(Newyork:Routeledge) pp. 11-19
Cunliffe, P (2011), ‘A Dangerous Duty:Power Paternalism and the Global Duty of Care,’ in Cunliffe, P.
ed. Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory and Practice (Newyork:
Routeledge) pp. 52-70
Deng, T, Rothchild, D. & Zartmann, W. (1996), Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in
Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution)
Douzinas, C. (2007), Human Rights and the Empire:The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitianism
(London:Routeledge-Cavendish) p.187
Evans, G. (2009), The Responsibility to Protect:Ending Mass Atrocities Crimes Once and For All
(Washington DC: Brookings) p. 241
Evans, G. (2012), The Future of Responsibility to Protect Lessons and Challenges’ in Genser, R. and
Cotler, I (eds.) The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time
(New York: Oxford University Press). pp. 375-380
Knox, G.H. (1783-1812), in Horseman, R. Expansion and American Indian Policy (East Lansin: Michigan
state university press) p. 54
Hehir, A. (2011), ‘Responsibility to Protect and International Law’, in Cunliffe, P. ed. Critical
Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory and Practice (Newyork:Routeledge:)
pp 84-100
Fisher, D. (2011) Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-First Century? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press) p. 303.
Kimaro S. et al (1999), ed Sovereignty as responsibility: Conflict management in Africa (Washington
DC: Brookings Institution press) p. 168
Loughlin, M. (2003), Ten Tenets of Sovereignty in Hart (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart
publishing) p. 73
Lund, M. (2001), ‘A Toolbox for Responding to Conflicts and Building Peace,’ in Reycheler, and
Paffenholz, (eds) Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, (Boulder,Co :Lynne Rienner) p.16
Mamdani, M. (2011), ‘Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish,’ in Cunliffe, P. ed. Critical
Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory and Practice (Newyork: Routeledge)
pp 19-34
Mccormack, T. (2011), ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the End of Western Century’ in Cunliffe, P. ed.
Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory and Practice
(Newyork:Routeledge) pp 35-38
Mcghie, P. and Sharma, S. (2012), ‘Kenya’ in Genser, R. and Cotler, I (eds.) The Responsibility to
Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press). pp.
279-292
16
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jacaps/vol4/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/2325-484X.4.1.1093

Aluoch: The Dilemma of Responsibility to Protect

Morada, N.M. (2012). ‘Asia and the pacific,’ in Genser, R. and Cotler, I (eds.) The Responsibility to
Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press). pp.
136-158
O’Connel, M.E. (2011), ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Critique’ in Cunliffe P. ed. Critical Perspectives on
the Responsibility to Protect Interrogating Theory and Practice (Newyork: Routeledge) pp 72-83
Orford, A. (2011), International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (UK:Cambridge University
Press)
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) on The Responsibility to Protect
Report (2001) (Ottawa: IDRC)
Smith, A. (1999) 1779, Wealth of Nations Books, IV-V (London: Penguin) p. 247
Vlasic, M.V. (2012), ‘Europe and North America’ in Genser, R. and Cotler, I (eds.) The Responsibility to
Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press). pp.
159-180
Weiss, T. (2004), The sunset of humanitarian intervention Security dialogue 35, 2

Journals
Arbour, L. (2008), ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice’,
Review of International Studies, 34, pp. 445-458
Ayoob, M. (2004), ‘Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International
Administration.’ Global Governance 10, No. 1 pp.99-118.
Bellamy, A.J. (2005), ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian
Intervention after Iraq.’ Ethics and International Affairs 19 (2):31–54.
Bellamy, A. (2006), ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005
World Summit,’ Ethics and International Affairs 20, no.2: 143-169.
Bellamy, A. (2009), Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities. (UK: Cambridge
Polity)
Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P.D. (2011), ‘The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’ Ivoire, Libya and the
responsibility to protect’. International Affairs 87:4 pp. 825–850
Chandler, D. (2004), ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the Liberal Peace’ International
Peacekeeping, Vol.11, no.1, Spring pp.59–81
Cohen, J. (2006), ‘Sovereign Equality vs. Imperial Right: The Battle over the “New World Order”.’
Constellations 13, no. 4: 485-505.
Cooper, R. (2005), "Imperial Liberalism" The National Interest, no.79, March 1st
http://nationalinterest.org/issue/mar-apr-2005 (accessed 12th February 2012}
17
Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

Deng, F.M. (2010), ‘From ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’." Global
Responsibility to Protect 2: 353-370
Deng, F. (2011), ‘Divided Nations and the Challenges of Protection’ Global Responsibility to Protect 3
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 438–450
Etzioni A. (2006), ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ Orbis, (Foreign Policy Research Institute
501 p.72
Krasner, Stephen, D. (2001), ‘Sovereignty’ Foreign Policy. No. 122: pp. 20-29
Koffi A. (1999), ‘Two concepts of Sovereignty,’ The Economist 352 no 8137
Luck, E. (2011), ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade’ Global Responsibility to Protect 3
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers pp.387–399
Mazower, M.(2006), An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Midtwentieth Century International Affairs 82, 3 553–566
http://www.mazower.com/articles/IA.pdf
Sharma, S. K. (2011), ‘RtoP at Ten Years’ Global Responsibility to Protect 3 (Martinus Nijhoff
publishers 383–3
Thakur, R. (2004), ‘Behind the Headlines’ Iraq and the responsibility to protect Vol 62 No. 1 (Canadian
institute of international affairs)

Articles and Internet sources
African Union Constitutive Act (2002)
Human Rights Watch Report (2012) July 26th
Foreign Policy (2011) The Case for Intervention in Ivory Coast, March 25th
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/25/the_case_for_intervention_in_the_ivory_coast?hideco
mments=yes {accessed 20th April 2012}
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect:Impact of R2P on Libya
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/

May 2011

International Court of Justice Report (1949) Corfu Channels Case April 9th
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1934) Article 1
Secretary General Report on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa (1998) http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/CAUSECONFLICT.PDF {accessed 10th
July 2012}
Us history.org (2012), Masachusetts Bay-The City Upon a Hill, (U.S. History online textbook)
http://www.ushistory.org/us/3c.asp
18
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jacaps/vol4/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/2325-484X.4.1.1093

